



Nuclear Disarmament Verification via Resonant Phenomena

(and other adventures in nuclear security)

Areg Danagoulian



Outline


- What's the big problem? (Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaties)
- Why template verification and how does it work?
- What is Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF)?
 - → NRF based verification
- Epithermal neutron physics
 - → epithermal neutron verification



Nuclear Arsenals

2017 Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories

The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of roughly 15,000 nuclear warheads; more than 90 percent belong to Russia and the United States. Approximately 9,600 warheads are in military service, with the rest awaiting dismantlement.



Sources: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris; U.S. Department of State. Updated January 31, 2017.

Arms Control
Association

- Significant Reduction since the Cold War
- „Доверяй, но проверяй!“ Но как? How? Ինչպե՞ս:



VERIFICATION

- How do treaty partners verify that the other side is dismantling actual warheads and not fakes? They don't.
- Verification: **delivery vehicles** – easier to verify.



- Problems: large leftover of non-deployed warheads
 - theft → nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation

→ **Authenticate warheads, without revealing secret information**





Our Research: physics-based cryptography, *template* verification

Authenticated template
“golden copy” of W88
Picked from a randomly
selected ICBM



Candidate
copies, W88



⋮

Is $A_0 = A_1$? ✓
 $A_0 = A_2$? ✓
 $A_0 = A_3$? ✓
⋮

Challenge: perform
checks while

- protecting secrets
- isotopically sensitive

→ need
cryptography -
physical
cryptography
→ need
resonances!




To dismantlement



Analogy: NRF to Optical Spectroscopy

Optical Spectroscopy



Nuclear Spectroscopy



NRF: unique fingerprint of isotopics



Broad-spectrum source \rightarrow NRF




unique line spectra for U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Pu-240...

$$\sigma_{r,j;0K}^{\text{NRF}}(E) = \pi g_r \left(\frac{\hbar c}{E} \right)^2 \frac{\Gamma_{r,0} \Gamma_{r,j}}{(E - E_r)^2 + (\Gamma_r/2)^2}.$$

$\Gamma \sim \text{meV} \rightarrow \text{thermal motion} \rightarrow \text{eV}$




NRF Weapon authentication Concept






NRF Weapon authentication Concept




- Physical Cryptography:
 - No direct data from the weapon itself
 - **SIGNAL** = $(Weapon) \otimes (Foil)$
 - Impossible to extract (Weapon)
- Soundness and completeness:
 - Authenticated template A -- acquire $S_{NRF}(A)$
 - Candidate weapon B -- acquire $S_{NRF}(B)$ and compare






What's a bomb and how does it work?




(source: wikipedia)



Simulated 2.1 or 2.5 MeV
bremsstrahlung beam

> 1000 core hours for
sufficient NRF statistics

Canonical hoax scenarios





Hoax scenario	Strongest discrepancy (σ)
WGPu \rightarrow U-238	107
WGPu \rightarrow FGPU	14.6

R.S. Kemp, A. Danagouliau, R. Macdonald, J.Vavrek, *Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads*, **PNAS** 113 (2016) 31.



NRF experimental setup

- Van de Graaff Accelerator
- 2.5 MeV e^- , DC beam
- 20 mA



Vacuum Tubes!!!




Proxy Warhead

- 3mm of ^{238}U
- 0.5mm of ^{27}Al
- 1.5" of plastic
- "MIT Linear Implosion Design"







Experimental setup







Hoax to Genuine comparisons





Hoax to Genuine comparisons



- 11σ discrepancy in U lines
- identical counts in Al



Extrapolations: the real bomb

- 5-10 σ in a (1+1)-hour proof-of-concept
- “Black Sea” model:
- 6X rate decrease


25 μ A \rightarrow 2.5 mA beam current:

- 100x rate increase


3 \rightarrow 30 HPGe detectors:

- 10x rate increase


\rightarrow measurement times of
~minutes



Black Sea Model



IBA TT100 Rhodotron



GammaSphere

J. R. Vavrek, B. S. Henderson, A. Danagoulian, “Experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence,” **PNAS** (2018), 201721278; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1721278115



Verification with Epithermal Resonant Assay (VERA)




Epithermal Resonant Cryptographic Radiography

- Epithermal neutron resonances in the 1-10 eV
- Neutron Resonance Transmission Assay (NRTA)

Chichester, D. L. & Sterbentz, J. W. Assessing the Feasibility of Using Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) for Assaying Plutonium in Spent Fuel Assemblies. JNMM XL, 4 (2012).

- Transmitted spectrum = isotopics \otimes geometry
- cryptographic reciprocal mask



- choose a resonance
- \rightarrow isotopic image








Fig. 6. Reconstructed projection for ^{235}U using the SAMMY code



Epithermal Resonant Cryptographic Radiography

- Epithermal neutron resonances in the 1-10 eV
- Transmitted spectrum = isotopics \otimes geometry.
- cryptographic reciprocal mask




$$A_{recip} = 1 / (A_{object} \times const.)$$


- ~ flat image: no geom. information
- spectrum reveals nothing about the pit




Simulations: Geometric hoax resistance



template




hoax





Simulations: WGPu pit vs. a RGPu hoax

- + Different isotopics result in different transmission spectra
- + Only ~100k incident counts necessary for a 5σ detection







Geometric Information Security

- + Compare the transmission image of the pit+reciprocal to that of a flat plate of the same total thickness
- + Images and spectra are identical – can't differentiate, thus cannot infer any geometric information → geometric **Zero Knowledge**


pit+reciprocal



plate



radial comparison






Isotopic Information Security

- + Protect the isotopics of the pit.
- + isotopics(pit+reciprocal) \neq isotopics (pit)
- + MC simulations of three scenarios:
 - 70% ^{239}Pu enriched pit, 98% enriched extension
 - 78% enriched pit and extension
 - 93% pit, 71% extension
 - the transmitted spectra are **identical**

→ isotopic Zero Knowledge

- Jake's MIT undergrad thesis




Jake J. Hecla, Areg Danagoulian, "Nuclear Disarmament Verification via Resonant Phenomena," *Nature Communications* 9, 2041-1723 (2018)



POC Experiments: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

- Can we avoid simple imaging? Yes – single pixel tomography
 - no need for complicated reciprocals
 - simple detectors
- Experimentally prove the feasibility of the concept
- Proxies for “**honest**” **template** pit and “**hoax**” pit:
 - **template**: 90% Mo / 10% W ($\text{Mo} \leftrightarrow {}^{239}\text{Pu}$: $\text{W} \leftrightarrow {}^{240}\text{Pu}$)
 - isotopic hoax – different isotopic ratio
 - geometric hoax – perform rotations
- Measurements: single pixel detector, ${}^6\text{Li}$ glass, TOF



- Work with PPPL on using smaller, precisely moderated DT sources for $\sim \text{eV}$ neutron beams.




The Future

- Perform epithermal experiments at to prove the epithermal concept
- Collaborate
 - national labs
 - other countries
 - Russia
- Need technological solutions for treaty verification → more ambitious, far reaching treaties
- How can we, physicists, help solve major societal problems?



The Team


Postdoc:



Dr. Brian Henderson

Students:

PhD



Jimmy

Jayson

Julie

Will

Ethan

S.M.

Undergrad




Ezra




Ben


Alumni:



Jake Hecla



Dr. Buck O'Day



Jill Rahon



Bobby Nelson

Jeremiah Collins